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The initial public oﬀering




Existing literature on initial public oﬀerings of a ﬁrm’s stock has taken
into analysis only two parties of the issuer, the underwriter, the informed
investor, either by neglecting one party for simpliﬁcation or uniting it with
another one as if they pursue the unique interests by forming a coalition.
In point of fact, the issuer, the underwriter, the informed investors are
separate entities. They have often conﬂicting objectives each other and
act in a diﬀerent and independent manner to seek for proﬁts of their own
by making the most of their information. The present article explicitly
introduces into enquiry the aspect of the tripartite conﬂicting interests of
initial public oﬀerings and investigates the eﬀects.
1 introduction
It is very much documented that in the initial public oﬀering(hereafter IPO) of
the ﬁrm there are wide spread underpricing phenomena. There have appeared
many theoretical articles so far. Allen and Faulhaber(1989), Welch(1989) as-
cribed the underpricing to signaling by the issuing ﬁrm. In their setting, there is
an issuing ﬁrm and an investor. The issuer knows the better about its prospec-
tive results and has superior information to the investor. The articles showed
that in this situation a good ﬁrm was willing to convey signals of its hopeful
prospects to distinguish himself from a bad one. Underpricing is the signal.
Baron(1982), Baron and Holmstrom(1980) analyzed a situation in which there
were an issuer and an underwriter. The underwriter is in charge of organizing
the IPO. He has superior information to the issuer. Moreover, for the distri-
bution of shares, he has eﬀorts to make which are unobservable by the issuer.
There are, thus, two incentive problems involved here. The authors investigated
the issuer’s optimal incentive contract in these circumstances. Benveniste and
Spindt(1989), Benveniste and Wilhelm(1990) set up a model in which there were
an issuer, an underwriter, informed investors, and uninformed investors. In this
setting, the underwriter, who was delegated to organize the IPO, was assumed
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1to maximize total proceeds of the IPO, therefore the issuer’s proﬁts. The au-
thors investigated the characters of the contract. Finally, Biais, Bossaerts and
Rochet(1998) investigated the issuer’s optimal contract. In their model, there
are an issuer, uninformed investors and a party which is a coalition of an un-
derwriter and informed investors. They studied the characters of this optimal
contract.
Although the approaches are very diﬀerent each other among these articles,
one common character of the models is that of the issuer, the underwriter and
the informed investor, only two parties are considered as separate entities in
analysis. Speciﬁcally, in Allen et al. and Welch the underwriter is absent. In
Baron and Baron et al., the informed investor is unconsidered. In Benveniste
and Spindt, Benveniste and Wilhelm, the underwriter maximizes total proceeds,
in other words, the issuer’s utility. This is, therefore, a model of the issuer-
underwriter incorporate. In Biais et al., the underwriter is assumed to be allied
with the informed investor.
In reality, the issuer, the underwriter, the informed investor are separate
entities. They act each in a diﬀerent and independent manner to pursue their
own proﬁts often conﬂicting one another. The objective of the present article is
to explicitly bring this aspect into analysis.
Let us take a look at the main idea of the article. In the ﬁrst place, this
is a positive analysis, in which regard it is diﬀerent from Baron, Baron et al.,
Biais et al., above. In order to introduce the feature of tripartite conﬂicts into
analysis, the present article takes a point of view of contract delegation. The
issuer is assumed rather unsophisticated;for the ﬁrst time issuer has usually
little expertise in ﬁnancial aﬀairs. He wants for various ability to organize
the IPO, information gathering, information oﬀering, advertising, pricing and
so forth. Therefore, the issuing ﬁrm delegates the whole IPO procedure to an
underwriter and pays the latter some commissions of a ﬁxed rate per share price.
The underwriter has as a seasoned ﬁnancial institution ample knowledge of the
ﬁnancial market to collect and analyze information possessed by institutional
investors and estimate the market valuation of shares to be issued. In full charge
of the IPO procedure, the underwriter decides upon the quantity allocation and
the price to maximize the proﬁts of his own, not those of the issuer’s nor the
investor’s, while trying to collect the investor’s private information.
There are two distinguishing features in the present article. One is, as
pointed out above, that account is taken of the diﬀerence of interests between
the issuer, the underwriter, the informed investor. In the setting of the present
article, those three parties pursue their own proﬁts diﬀerent from each other.
The second feature is the introduction of the eﬀects of the possibility that the
underwriter buys part of shares himself for the purpose of making proﬁts by
reselling them after the IPO. Indeed, there are no deﬁnite legal restrictions to
how IPO shares are allotted to subscribers by the underwriter. The IPO pro-
cedure, especially, the allocation and the pricing of shares is for the most part
left to the discretion of the underwriter. The underwriter can adjust his own
and subscribers’ allocation of shares according to information collected among
the subscribers in order to make the largest proﬁts.
2The underwriter can make proﬁts through two channels. First, he earns
commissions of a certain rate for the issue price. Therefore, he gains the more
the higher he sets the price. In this respect, the underwriter is motivated to give
a high price to the issue. On the other hand, he can make proﬁts by purchasing
part of the IPO shares and selling them on the market after the issue if the
after-market price is higher than the issue price. In this regard, therefore, it is
in the interest of the underwriter to set a low IPO price in order to make proﬁts
by reselling.
There is, as is seen, a trade-oﬀ of incentives on the part of the underwriter
to set a high or low price. In the model of the present article, there are re-
strictions, that is, there is a ﬁxed amount of shares to be issued and there are
only an underwriter and an informed investor between whom shares are dis-
tributed. However, there is no uninformed investor considered. Even in this
simple context, it is not obvious how the underwriter assigns and prices shares
in consideration of the maximization of his proﬁts.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, the
parties involved of the game and the scenario are described. In section 3, the
model is formally presented. In section 4, the characteristics of the solution are
scrutinized. The section 5 is a conclusion.
2 scenario
There are a ﬁrm, an underwriter, an informed investor1 The ﬁrm wants to sell
its ﬁxed amount of shares on the market for the ﬁrst time. This ﬁrm or issuer is
assumed to be unable to do it by itself; initial public oﬀering requires marketing,
allotting, pricing of shares to be issued and this demands a lot of expertise that
the ﬁrst time issuer does not usually have. Therefore, the issuer has to rely on
someone possessing such expertise. Here is where the underwriter comes in.
The underwriter, which has great experiences and expertise as a seasoned
ﬁnancial institution, takes on the task of organizing the IPO. He markets, prices,
distributes IPO shares to subscribers. In reality the syndicate of underwriters
is often formed by several ﬁnancial institutions. Here we assume though that
there is only one underwriter.
The informed, often said regular, investor is a large investor like an invest-
ment bank, a broker, a securities ﬁrm which has great expertise on the ﬁnancial
market. Such an investor may well have some information on the post-oﬀering
market valuation of IPO equity. The underwriter gets in touch with this in-
vestor to seek for his information. In practice, there will be several informed
investors. Here, it is assumed though, by putting together all possible informed
investors, that there is only one informed investor.
The informational structure is assumed in a following way. The issuer re-
veals all his information to the underwriter in respect of the share value2 The
1In this article, the presence of uninformed retail investors is neglected. Accordingly, the
issue of their winner’s curse will not be studied as in Rock(1986).
2Therefore, the aspect is disregarded concerning signaling by the issuer as in Allen and
3underwriter reveals to the informed investor all information provided by the
issuer and his own information. The informed investor has private information
unobservable by the other parties. Therefore, in this model only the informed
subscriber possesses private information.
The issuer of the present model is rather unsophisticated. The issuer dele-
gates the whole IPO procedures to the underwriter. The issuer pays as a com-
mission a ﬁxed percentage of the price per share to the underwriter3 Totally
designated to organize the whole IPO process, the underwriter decides upon
the quantity allocation and the price of the shares while seeking the informed
subscriber’s private information. It is irrelevant whether or not the underwriter
reveals his information to the issuer as well as the subscriber, because of the
whole delegation of the IPO procedures to the underwriter.
In fact, since the underwriter and the subscriber have some information,
the issuer may as well try to make the underwriter reveal those two pieces
of information by the construction of a commission scheme. However, in this
article, we will not consider such a sophisticated issuer. The issuer here just
agrees to pay a commission of some ﬁxed rate for the price per share. This
commission rate may be decided by some industry standard or mainly by the
underwriter taking advantage of his superior ﬁnancial knowledge.
Here is some justiﬁcation for such an issuer. Usually, the ﬁrst time issuer
has not acquired so many experiences in ﬁnancial aﬀairs that he can deal with
so complicated IPO procedures. Not having grown so big yet, such a ﬁrm
has relatively poor ﬁnancial expertise. First of all, it will be unable to collect
information in want of acquaintances among ﬁnancial institutions. Even if able
to gather information, it cannot be expected to analyze the information with so
little ﬁnancial knowledge.
Besides, the prospective underwriter is usually a ﬁnancial institution with
which the issuer already has long-standing relationships. As the result, it has far
more information on the issuer than is acquirable by other ﬁnancial competitors.
The underwriter has, therefore, a very strong in-competitive position in IPO
business.
When it comes to the determination of a commission rate, it will be very dif-
ﬁcult for an issuer in a situation described above to build an optimal commission
schedule for information gathering dealing with a longstanding, much practised
ﬁnancial institution. The issuer modeled in this article is quite a reasonable
approximation of the reality.
Let us return to the underwriter. The underwriter, as described above,
organizes the IPO. What is distinctive in this article is that account is taken of
the fact that the underwriter may also buy part of the shares himself as well
as the informed investor. Therefore he distributes the shares between him and
the informed subscriber. He makes proﬁts through two channels; commissions
Faulhaber(1989), Welch(1989).
3Although the linear compensation scheme is assumed for the underwriter, in reality it may
not be so because of the existence of the overallotement right and the warrant right granted
to the underwriter. This issue will not be treated in this article. For warrants, see Barry,
Muscarella, Vetsuypens(1991).
4gained per share price and purchasing and reselling of shares. He maximizes his
total proﬁts, building a quantity-price scheme to make the informed subscriber
to reveal his information.
3 model
In this section, we shall formally present the model. All the three parties are
risk neutral, the issuer, the underwriter, the informed subscriber. The issuer
plans to issue Q units of equity through the underwriter.
The issuer is assumed to convey to the underwriter all relevant information
it has relative to the valuation of the shares. Accordingly, the underwriter is
informationally advantaged and there is no issue of double asymmetric
information between the issuer and the underwriter.
The underwriter organizes the IPO. He sets the per share price p and the
quantity allocations to himself and the informed investor q0, q1. The under-
writer, for his part, has some information on the post-IPO stock value v0, which
is positive. It is known only by himself. Let us assume, however, that he reveals
credibly to the informed subscriber his private information v0 as well as all in-
formation furnished by the issuer during the road show in which the underwriter
communicates with the informed investor.
The informed investor or subscriber has private information on the post-
issue value of the stocks v1, which none of the other agents know. v1 takes
a value in the interval of [v1v1] ⊂ R+. The agents other than the informed
subscriber knows the distribution of v1 while unaware of the realized value v1.
The distribution function of v1 is F(v1), which is absolutely continuous and has
the density f(v1) that never takes zero in the interval of its deﬁnition. Finally,
the post-IPO price per share is
P1
i=0 vi.
As is the case in reality, the issuer is supposed to pay as a commission a
ﬁxed percentage of the price per share to the underwriter. Speciﬁcally, the
issuer agrees to pay a commission of rate a for the price per share, thus ap
per share when the price is p. Since the issuer entrusts completely the IPO to
the underwriter, it is irrelevant whether or not the underwriter’s information
is revealed to the issuer. We disregard completely the question of the optimal
commission schedule from the issuer’s point of view.
The underwriter, as already seen, has two channels through which to make
proﬁts; commissions pQ and gains by the reselling after the IPO (
P1
i=0 vi−p)q0.
He buys shares when ﬁnding it in his interest. Let us put the upper limit to the
amount of shares he can buy, that is, 0 ≤ q0 = (Q − q1) ≤ tQwhere0 < t < 1.
Even if there is no deﬁnite legal restriction to the quantity the underwriter
can buy, he may have a budgetary constraint or take account of the possibility
that he may impair future business by putting in jeopardy relationships with
informed institutional investors if he does not allot any shares to them. This
observation justiﬁes the imposition of the limit on the underwriter’s shares to be
alloted. While unaware of the private information of the informed subscriber,
he can make a mechanism to make this subscriber reveal the information. Let
5us concentrate on the direct mechanism (Myerson(1982)); speciﬁcally, the un-
derwriter proposes to the informed subscriber the map
(q1 (v1),p(v1)) : [v1,v1] 7→ [(1 − t)Q,Q] × R.
q1(v1) is a quantity alloted to the informed subscriber and p(v1) is the per share
price.
Indeed, q1 andp must be also dependent on v0. Let us recall, however, the
underwriter reveals v0 to the informed subscriber. In that event, regarding v0
as ﬁxed, we can neglect the dependence of q1 andp on v0. From now on, we
think of v0 as ﬁxed.
The underwriter is unaware of the true value of the informed subscriber’s
information. Therefore, the latter does not necessarily choose the contract of
v1. If the informed subscriber with information v1 chooses the contract of ˜ v1,
his expected proﬁt is
u1 (v1, ˜ v1) := ((v0 + v1) − p(˜ v1))q1(˜ v1).
If the informed subscriber with information v1 selects the contract of his








As is mentioned above, these two equations also depend upon v0 but this is
known to the informed subscriber as well. Therefore, we can ignore it by think-
ing it ﬁxed.
Unable to force the informed subscriber to divulge his information, the un-
derwriter has to make a contract which induces him to betray his information
at will. We thus deﬁne the implementable contract;




As is usually done, we turn the implementable contract into the manageable
form. The implementable contract is characterized by the following incentive
compatibility condition.
Lemma (incentive compatibility). If the contract (q1(v1),p(v1)) is imple-
mentable, the following two conditions are satisﬁed;
q1(v1)is non-decreasing, (2)
q1(v1) = ˙ u1(v1)a.e.. (3)
6Conversely, the implementable contract (q1(v1),p(v1)) can be constructed, if









It is not enough that the underwriter manages to get the informed investor
to tell the truth. The latter has no obligation to participate in the IPO. The
condition has to be put which ensures that the informed investor gains no less in
participating in than abstaining from the IPO. Let this participation condition
be
c ≤ u1(v1),where c is a positive constant.




r is an yield rate of other ﬁnancial products but for simpliﬁcation this article
adopts a simpler condition. Indeed, this participation condition can be trans-
formed into a more manageable form, considering that u1 is non-decreasing by
the incentive compatibility condition, 2 and 3, into
c ≤ u1 (v1). (5)
We have to put another participation condition which this time applies to
the issuer, who will relinquish the IPO if the issue price is too unfavorable to
him. This condition would be natural to put as something like d ≤ p, which
indicates that the issue price is higher than some value. However, to keep the
model manageable, we express the participation constraint in the following way;
u1 (v1) ≤ d,where d is a positive constant.
With the same argument as for 5, the following condition is suﬃcient;
u1 (v1) ≤ d,where d is a positive constant. (6)
It is assumed as a matter of course that c < d.
Let us see that this form of the participation condition will be justiﬁed.
When 6 is satisﬁed, we have from the incentive compatibility condition of the
lemma








≥ (v0 + v1) −
d
q1 (v1)




The last inequality shows that the participation condition 6 leads to an inferior
limit of the price which is a natural condition to participation of the issuer. We









Then it is ensured that the issue price is always bounded from below by a
positive number. This condition can be interpreted yet another way. It can





. Let us recall d is a superior limit of the
underwriter’s utility and (1 − t)Q ≤ q1 ≤ Q. Then d
(1−t)Q is the maximum
possible utility per share. Therefore, 8 can be interpreted in a way that the
maximum possible utility per share is less than the minimum share value. In
another phrase, the maximum per share utility can be eﬀectuated even when
the minimum per share value is realized.
We assume yet another condition;




Let us rewrite it as (v0 + v1) − (v0 + v1) < d−c
(1−t)Q. The left side is obviously
the diﬀerence of the highest and the lowest value of the shares. On the other
hand, d − c is a diﬀerence of the superior and the inferior limit of the informed
investor’s utility. Then d−c
(1−t)Q is the largest diﬀerence per share of those limits
since (1 − t)Q ≤ q1 ≤ Q. Considering this, 9 can be interpreted as meaning
that the largest possible diﬀerence of the share value is smaller than the greatest
diﬀerence of the investor’s per share proﬁts.
Finally, it must be ensured that 8 and refe;c d can hold at the same time. If
these conditions are satisﬁed, it must be that






< v0 + v1.
We assume that it holds.
8We are now ready for the statement of the underwriter’s maximization prob-
lem. He maximizes his expected proﬁt under the incentive constraints and the








vi − p(v1))(Q − q1(v1)))f(v1)dv1
s. t.
2, 3, 5, 6,
(1 − t)Q ≤ q1(v1) ≤ Q.
We use optimal control to solve the maximization problem. It is possible by
virtue of the incentive compatibility lemma. We ﬁrst ﬁnd the optimal q1 and
u1, and then retrieve p by 4.
Let us proceed now to the optimal control setting of the problem. The
tactics is to make q1 and u1 state variables and introduce a control variable.







vi − (a − 1)
u1
q1
Q − u1)f(v1)dv1. (10)
We can also transform (1−t)Q ≤ q1 ≤ Q by the monotonicity of q1 (see the
lemma) into
(1 − t)Q ≤ q1 (v1), q1 (v1) ≤ Q. (11)
Finally, with regard to 2, introducing a control variable, we put
z := ˙ q1, z ≥ 0. (12)









vi − (a − 1)
u1
q1
Q − u1)f(v1)dv1 (13)
s. t.
˙ q1 = z a.e., (14)
˙ u1 = q1 a.e., (15)
c ≤ u1 (v1), (16)
u1 (v1) ≤ d, (17)
(1 − t)Q ≤ q1 (v1), (18)
q1 (v1) ≤ Q, (19)
0 ≤ z. (20)
Theorem. The optimal contract is characterized as follows;
if a > t,
q1 = (1 − t)Q, (21)
u1 = (1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + c, (22)




and if a = t,
q1 = (1 − t)Q, (24)
u1 = (1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + u1(v1), (25)




where u1(v1) is undetermined, (27)
and if a ≤ t,
q1 = (1 − t)Q, (28)
u1 = −(1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + d, (29)




Proof. We apply the necessary condition of optimal control to solve the problem.
Let us ﬁrst set the Hamiltonian. Setting λ0, λ1, λ2 as multipliers, we have










f + λ1q1 + λ2z (31)
whereλ := (λ0,λ1,λ2).
10We examine the two cases λ0 = 0,1 separately.
impossibility of λ0 = 0.
Let us supposeλ0 = 0 and write necessary conditions in the ﬁrst place.
˙ λ1 = −
∂H
∂u1
= 0 a.e., (32)
˙ λ2 = −
∂H
∂q1
= −λ1 a.e.. (33)
As end point conditions, we have
λ1(v1) ≤ 0, λ1(v1)(u1(v1) − c) = 0, (34)
λ2(v1) ≤ 0, λ2(v1)(q1(v1) − (1 − t)Q) = 0, (35)
λ1(v1) ≤ 0, λ1(v1)(u1(v1) − d) = 0, (36)
λ2(v1) ≤ 0, λ2(v1)(q1(v1) − Q) = 0, (37)
In addition, z has to maximize H (u1,q1,z,λ) with optimal u1 and q1 when





= 0 if λ2 < 0,
is undetermined if λ2 = 0.
(38)
From 32, λ1 is constant and besides due to 34, 36, λ1 is a non-positive
constant.
We will see that λ1 is in point of fact negative. To see that, let us suppose
λ1 = 0. Then λ2 < 0 by 33 and (λ0,λ1,λ2) 6= 0. It follows that z = 0 from 38.
We see that q1 is constant from 14. On the other hand, since λ2 < 0, it must
be that q1 (v1) = (1−t)Q and q1 (v1) = Q by the end point conditions , 35 and
37. This is a contradiction to q1 being constant. Therefore, λ1 6= 0.
Let us proceed now with λ1 negative. First, let us recall λ2 ≤ 0 from the
existence of z maximizing the Hamiltonian. Then, since ˙ λ2 = −λ1 > 0, at least
λ2 < 0 in[v1,v1),
which leads to
z = 0 in[v1,v1).
11Thus from 14, seeing that v1 is negligible,
q1 = (1 − t)Q in[v1,v1]. (39)
Then from the terminal condition 37,
λ2 (v1) = 0.
Besides we have from 33
λ2 = −λ1 (v1 − v1) + λ2 (v1). (40)
Therefore from this equation
λ2 (v1) = 0 = −λ1 (v1 − v1) + λ2 (v1).
Using this, we can rewrite λ2 as
λ2(v1) = −λ1(v1 − v1) + λ1(v1 − v1) = −λ1(v1 − v1).
Let us ﬁnd u1. Seeing that, from 34 and 36,
u1 (v1) = c and u1 (v1) = d,
we have by 15
u1 = (1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + u1 (v1) = (1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + c. (41)
At the same time, u1 must satisfy u1 (v1) = d. As the result, it must be that
d = (1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + c. (42)
Altogether, only when this condition is satisﬁed, there is a candidate of
optimal solutions in case of λ0 = 0. However, the assumption 9 does not admit
of this condition. Hence the impossibility of λ0 = 0.
case of λ0 = 1.
We have seen that we can posit λ0 = 1. From now onwards we suppose so.
First, as above, let us write necessary conditions.
˙ λ1 = −
∂H
∂u1
= ((a − 1)Q
1
q1
+ 1)f a.e., (43)







− λ1 a.e., (44)
12and as end conditions, 34, 35, 36, 37.
As is in the previous analysis, there must be z maximizing the Hamiltonian.
Therefore, here too obtains 3 and 38.
We split the analysis into three cases a > t, a ≤ t.
case of a > t.







f > 0 a.e..
Therefore,
˙ λ1 > 0 a.e..





Moreover, from this ﬁrst inequality and the transversality condition 34, we
deduce
u1(v1) = c.
Let us turn to λ2. From the value of λ1 deduced above and 44, it is easy to





The ﬁrst inequality also leads to q1(v1) = (1 − t)Q by the transversality condi-
tion.






q1 = (1 − t)Q. (45)
Moreover,






(1 − t)Q(v − v1) + c
(1 − t)Q




case of a ≤ t. Let us suppose a ≤ t. First, we prove that
λ1 ≤ 0. (48)
Proof. We shall prove λ1 ≤ 0 by the reductio ad absurdum. Let us suppose
there exists v0
1 such that λ1(v0
1) > 0. Then there is in the neighborhood of v0
1
such v1 that v1 6= v1 and λ1(v1) > 0 and that there exists ˙ λ1 at v1, because
λ1 is absolutely continuous. Now we can suppose λ1(v1) > 0. Then there is in
[v1,v1] a non-negligible set S at which point ˙ λ1 exists (this is obvious again by




˙ λ1(s)ds + λ1(v1) ≤ 0.
Thus if we take t ∈ S, ˙ λ1(t) = ((a − 1)Q 1
q1(t) + 1)f(t) > 0. It follows that
q1(t) > (1 − a)Q, which leads to q1(v1) > (1 − a)Q due to the monotonicity of
q1. Therefore,
˙ λ1(v1) = ((a − 1)Q
1
q1(v1)
+ 1)f(v1) > 0
.
Again, by the monotonicity of q1, it is true in fact that ˙ λ1 > 0 a.e. in [t,v1].









˙ λ1(s)ds + λ1(v1) > 0.
This is a contradiction to λ1 (v1) ≤ 0. Consequently, we have proved λ1 ≤ 0.





14,which leads from the transversality condition to
q1 (v1) = (1 − t)Q.






q1 = (1 − t)Q. (49)
Let us split now the analysis into two cases a = 1 and a < t.
case of a = t.





Therefore λ1 = α ≤ 0,where α is a constant. It turns out in fact that
α = 0. Suppose α < 0. Then by the transversality condition u1 (v1) = c and
u1 (v1) = d. Since we know q1, we have
u1 = (1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + u1(v1) = (1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + c.
It must be at the same time from the terminal condition that
u1(v1) = (1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + c = d
It is impossible by the assumption 9. It has been proved that α = 0.
Let us suppose so. u1 can be written as above as
u1 = (1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + u1(v1).
However, since λ1 = 0, u1(v1) can not be determined from the transversality
condition. Indeed if q1 and u1 are put into the maximand of the optimal control
problem, it is seen that u1(v1) is irrelevant to the maximization of the objective
function. Therefore
case of a < t.
In this case, it is seen from 43 and q1 that
˙ λ1 < 0.
Therefore λ1(v1) < 0 and from the transversality condition,
15u1(v1) = d.
Now we have
u1 = −(1 − t)Q(v1 − v1) + d. (50)
and




4 characterization of the solution
From the theorem, several propositions can be derived immediately.
Proposition 1. Whatever the relation between a and t, the underwriter always
buys himself his maximum amount of the shares, (1 − t)Q.
In general, the underwriter is in a dilemma. If he sets the price high, he
gains by way of commissions a but has to pay more for the shares he retains
for himself for the purpose of reselling them after the IPO. If the price is set
low, he makes less proﬁts by commissions but gains more by reselling later the
shares he has bought at the low price. Intuitionally, the underwriter will decide
to set a high price to gain by the commission rate when this is enough high
and refrain from buying many shares himself. On the other hand, in case of the
low commission rate, he will choose to make proﬁts by setting a low price even
though to his disadvantage in commission earnings and buying shares himself
and reselling them after the IPO.
However, contrary to this intuition, the proposition states that despite the
existence of such strategic choices, the underwriter does not change how to dis-
tribute the shares according as the commission rate( thus the relations between
a and t )changes; He always keeps for himself up to the limit.
Let us see this inﬂexibility of the quantity allocation from another point of
view.
Proposition 2. Given a commission rate(that is, with a and t ﬁxed) the un-
derwriter does not change the allocation pattern of the shares according as the
realized value of the subscriber’s information changes, namely hold back as many
as possible and giving the rest to the subscriber.
Therefore, even if the share value
P1
i=0 vi varies, the share allocation is un-
changed. This quantity inﬂexibility translates into that of the price.
16Proposition 3. Given a commission rate a and t, the price is insensitive to
the share value change.
The price and the quantity are related by 4. Obviously, the rigid quantity
allocation leads to the inﬂexible price.
This price schedule is rather anomalous. It is totally independent of the real-
ized share value v1. As is seen from the theorem, it only depends on the outside
opportunity values c and d and the boundary points of the interval of v1, v1 and
v1. This price schedule, accordingly, indeed reﬂects outside opportunities and
to some degree the distribution of the possible value of the private information,
but not in the least the realized private information value.
Proposition 4. Underpricing persists in both cases a > t, a < t. It is more
serious in the latter case.
Proof. The expected price of the share value is v0 + Ev1. Let us denote it as
m. In case of a < t, m − p = Ev1 − v1 + d
(1−t)Q and when a > t, m − p =
Ev1 − v1 + c
(1−t)Q. Therefore, it is obvious from 9.
Let us ﬁrst notice the diﬀerence of the prices between the two case a > t
and a < t. The two prices are diﬀerent although the quantity allocations are
identical. What does this diﬀerence result from? In fact, as is seen from the
theorem or the proof, it comes from which end condition is binding between the
initial and terminal condition, that is, u(v1) ≥ c and u1(v1) ≤ d.
As is explained above, when the commission rate is high enough, the un-
derwriter elects to earn more with the commissions by setting the price high,
therefore siding with the issuer; hence the initial condition is binding, that is,
u(v1) = c in case of a > t.
On the other hand, with a low commission rate, the underwriter is willing
to make proﬁts rather by the purchase and reselling of the shares; therefore
by setting a low price. He takes sides with the subscriber with the result that
the terminal condition is binding, u1(v1) = d, in case of a ≤ t. Therefore, in
this case, the price is restrained low because of the underwriter’s ability to buy
shares.
In the real IPO, it is usual that the commission rate a is much lower than
the maximum possible share of the underwriter t. Therefore it may be that the
underwriter has strong incentives to set the price low because being able to buy
himself, he looks after the same interests as the subscriber.
Let us turn to the underpricing now. In the model of the present article are
three sources of the underpricing. The ﬁrst is the subscriber’s private informa-
tion. It requires some costs to get him to participate in the IPO and reveal his
private information.
The second is the underwriter’s own interests in buying shares himself and
making proﬁts by selling. As has been seen, it leads to the quantity and price
rigidness to hinder the rent extraction from the subscriber.
The third is a possibility of the underwriter’s collusion, as it were, with
the subscriber described above. It has been seen that when the commission
17rate is enough small with respect to his maximum possible share amount(i.e.
a < t), the underwriter elects to make more proﬁts by the buying and reselling
of shares. He shares interests with the subscriber and sides with him to set the
price low. This is the reason why in case of a < t there is greater underpricing.
As is mentioned above, this is a usual case in the real world. Therefore, it is
worthwhile to consider whether the underwriter’s ability to buy shares himself
does not give him strong incentives to set a low price in an actual IPO process.
5 conclusion
This article has analyzed the circumstances of the IPO in which the three par-
ties,namely the issuer, the underwriter, the informed subscriber pursue each
their own interests which may be conﬂicting.
The premise of the model has been that the issuer lacks know-how relative
to the issue of the shares. He does not possess enough ﬁnancial expertise to
be able to analyze market reactions to or market evaluation of the IPO. On
the other hand, the underwriter has ample knowledge of the ﬁnancial market to
collect and analyze information possessed by institutional investors and estimate
the market valuation of shares to be issued. Therefore the issuer relies on the
underwriter for the issuing with a quite simple remuneration scheme for the
latter, that is, a linear commission.
In these circumstances, the underwriter decides on the share allocation. He
can buy part of the shares himself while allotting the rest to the informed
subscriber. There are two sources of gains for the underwriter; commission
gains and proﬁts of purchase and reselling of shares. This article has adopted
a rather simple setting in which there are only two parties buying shares, the
underwriter and the informed subscriber but not an uninformed investor. Even
in this simple context, it is not so obvious how the underwriter assigns shares
and decides upon the price, allowing for commission earnings and proﬁts of
reselling shares.
The interaction of these two eﬀects has been investigated. Intuition asserts
that when commission fees are high enough, the underwriter allocates shares in
such a way that he can rather make proﬁts through the commission by setting
the high price and in the opposite case he sets the price as low as possible to
make gains by way of selling retained shares on the market after the IPO.
It has been demonstrated in the present article that contrary to this intuition,
the underwriter does not change the pattern of share allocation according to the
commission rate. In addition, given a commission rate, the underwriter does not
change allocations nor the price whatever the subscriber’s private information.
Therefore the price reﬂects no realized value of the shares in our setting.
Finally, although not changing the quantity allocation in response to the
variation of the commission rate, the underwriter does change the price. When
the commission rate is low enough, the underwriter sets a higher price than in
case of a high commission rate, and that keeping the same quantity allocation.
To no surprise, there is larger underpricing with a low commission rate. Indeed,
18in this case, the underwriter shares the same interest as the subscriber; buy-
ing shares at a low price. This result gives some insight into the actual IPO,
where there may be some factors of underpricing caused by this incentive of the
underwriter’s.
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